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Abstract. Confidence tricksters have always defrauded the unwary. The
computer era has merely extended their range and made it possible for
them to target anyone in the world who has an email address. Nowa-
days, they send phishing messages that are specially crafted to deceive.
Improving user awareness has the potential to reduce their effectiveness.
We have previously developed and empirically-validated phishing aware-
ness programmes. Our programmes are specifically designed to neutral-
ize common phish-related misconceptions and teach people how to de-
tect phishes. Many companies and individuals are already using our pro-
grammes, but a persistent niggle has been the amount of time required
to complete the awareness programme. This paper reports on how we
responded by developing and evaluating a condensed phishing awareness
video that delivered phishing awareness more efficiently. Having watched
our video, participants in our evaluation were able to detect phishing
messages significantly more reliably right after watching the video (com-
pared to before watching the video). This ability was also demonstrated
after a retention period of eight weeks after first watching the video.
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1 Introduction
More than twenty years after its emergence, phishing still succeeds [1, 37, 43].
Phishing attacks are increasingly sophisticated. It used to be easy to spot phish-
ing messages due to poor language use and incorrect spelling; nowadays phishers
are far smarter, sending plausible-looking messages calculated to deceive. They
have also migrated from exclusively using email to plying their trade on a range
of messaging platforms including messages in social media and messaging apps.
A very popular trick is to entice the target to follow a link that will install mal-
ware or visit a doppelga¨nger website. The latter will persuade victims to divulge
sensitive information, such as their access credentials. Automated detection is a
powerful defence, but far from 100% effective [3, 15]. To narrow the gap left by
technical measures, we need to make recipients of online messages aware of how
to detect phishing attempts.
Our research group has a long history of developing phishing awareness
programmes (including apps, flyers, reading material, presentations for sem-
inars) and have carried out several user studies verifying their effectiveness
[5–7,26,28,33,39–41]. Our initial programmes required learners to spend between
20 to 45 minutes completing the awareness programmes. Evaluations showed that
all programmes significantly increased phishing detection rates. However, com-
panies are concerned about the amount of time employees have to commit to
these programmes. In response, we developed a video, which made it possible for
us to shorten the time people needed to commit, because we could benefit from
the visualisation functionality videos offer. The video now lasts only 5 minutes.
The video was developed iteratively, incorporating feedback from people with
various backgrounds (such as lay users, video producers, psychologists and se-
curity experts). The final video was evaluated by 89 participants who detected
phishing messages significantly more often after watching the video. Many were
able to demonstrate a retained ability to do this eight weeks later. The video was
improved even further based on the feedback provided during the evaluation and
the result of the evaluation, i.e. for those attack types participants performed
worst, the explanations in the video were improved. Thus, our contribution is
twofold: (1) the developed video based on previous research on phishing aware-
ness programmes, and (2) its evaluation both straight after watching the video
and during a retention study eight weeks after watching the video. We published
the video3 under the Creative Commons licence CC BY-SA 4.0 to remove all
barriers to its use.
2 Development Process
2.1 Identification of the Relevant Content
The content to be covered is the following. The video should make the watcher
aware of commonly-used phisher strategies. For example, trustworthy-looking
messages, with familiar design and language employing psychological tricks to
entice victims to click on an embedded link. They should also be aware of the
possible consequences of clicking on a link. For example, malware could be down-
loaded onto their device. The web page they visit could look authentic, but actu-
ally be owned by a phisher. If credentials are divulged on this faux site, they could
be used to facilitate identity theft. The video also deliberately addresses com-
mon phish-related misconceptions identified in the literature [11, 12, 17, 18, 20].
These include the following: (1) Phishers only send emails. In fact, they also use
other mediums such as short text and social networking messages; (2) Phishing
always harvests online banking credentials. In fact, phishers can actually fake
any arbitrary web site: credentials are what they want; (3) The displayed name
of the sender can be trusted to reflect the actual sender. In fact, details are
faked very easily. The displayed sender name cannot be relied upon to signal
3 German Phishing Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XeslAkZIuwY&t=9s
English Phishing Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4y2wzYpIKw
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authenticity; (4) Only wealthy people are targeted by phishers. On the con-
trary, anyone can be targeted, independently of how well known they are, how
wealthy or their status in an organisation. (5) Technical security mechanisms
are able to catch and block all phish messages. Actually, sophisticated phishers
design their messages in such a way that the technical measures do not catch
them; (6) The ‘S’ in HTTPS is an infallible signal of integrity. In reality, many
phishers use website certificates to ally fears 4; and (7) Trustworthy phrases in
a website URL are a signal of trustworthiness. In fact, these are merely tricks
used by the unscrupulous to trap the unwary. Thus, the video should help peo-
ple to distinguish between phishing and genuine messages. Similar to our more
time-consuming awareness programmes, we focus the learner’s attention on the
difference between the URL’s actual destination and the destination it seems to
be. Only by examining the link can people reliably distinguish between phish
and genuine messages. The following instructions, explanations, and hints were
included in the video:
Instruction-1: Locate the Actual Destination of a Displayed Link:
The first step in phish detection is to know how to identify the actual destination
the link will send people to. It might be in a tooltip, a status bars or in a special
dialogue. They also need to be aware of the nuances behind links. Sometimes
the actual destination is concealed behind a button or image or text like ‘click
here’. The actual destination is often hidden unless the person knows how to
look for it. In rare cases the actual URL is displayed in the clear. The displayed
tooltip might be faked too, in order to lull people into a false sense of security.
Instruction-2: Identify the So-Called Who-Area of the URL:
After people have identified the actual destination URL, they should know how
to identify the domain, what we refer to as the who-area. In the video, we told
people that this is the last two terms that are separated by a dot before the first
stand-alone “/” of a URL 5.
We also tell them that phishers deceive people by embedding the genuine
company name somewhere in the URL rather than the who-area. They could
place it either before or after the who-area. They should not rely on the sig-
nal conveyed by the use of HTTPS. Examples of phishing URLs are provided:
https://www.gmail.com.mail-nows.com/login
https://mail-nows.com/https://www.gmail.com/login.
Instruction 3: Check Authenticity of the Who-Area:
Having located the who-area, the final step is to verify its authenticity, basically
by checking it character by character. They are made aware of the fact that
phishers often (1) use trustworthy terms (e.g. ‘secure-shop.com’) in the who-
area; (2) stealthily replace characters. For example, they might replace a ‘d’
with ‘cI’ or introduce typos such as ‘mircosoft’.
4 To avoid confusion we used https in all our phishing examples
5 The study was carried out in Germany which meant we focused on domains with
two terms e.g. amazon.de and we did not consider other conventions followed by
countries like the U.K. with three terms, e.g. amazon.co.uk.
3
2.2 Video Development
We developed a story and a text for the voice-over based on the content being
communicated by the messages, together with someone professionally developing
awareness videos. We used simple language and non-technical terms (e.g. use
of the phrase “who-area” for domain). We labelled screenshots to direct their
attention to the location of important information (e.g. the status bar). We asked
people of different ages with varying backgrounds and levels of expertise with IT
and security to provide feedback to help us to improve and refine the video. The
professional video producer developed the video using our text and underlying
story. The video was improved, based on feedback from a number of people who
were representative of the anticipated participants.
3 Evaluation – Methodology
The evaluation focused on the video’s effectiveness in order to reveal significant
improvements, in terms of phish detection ability. The following hypotheses were
formulated:
H1: Participants, having watched the video, correctly judge the legitimacy of
messages more often i.e. identify more phishing messages, and identify legitimate
messages more reliably.
H2: Eight weeks after watching the video, participants correctly judge the
legitimacy of messages more often i.e. identify more phishing messages, and
identify legitimate messages more reliably.
3.1 Study Design
We conducted an online between-subjects study in two sessions. Hypothesis 1 is
evaluated with the data from the first session and hypothesis 2 is evaluated with
the data from both sessions. The tasks in the first evaluation session were:
1. Judge screenshots of messages. Decide whether each is a phish or legitimate.
2. Watch the video.
3. Judge screenshots of messages. When participants were asked to judge mes-
sages, the question was: “Is this a fraudulent message?’. Possible answers
were: ‘Yes, it is a fraudulent message’. ‘No, it is not a fraudulent message’.
4. Provide video feedback (free text answers).
5. Provide demographic information.
6. Grant permission for us to contact them to engage with a retention study.
If they consented, we requested their email address and provided them with
a random code to ensure an anonymous link between sessions.
During the second session (approximately eight weeks later), consenting partic-
ipants were invited to participate in the retention study, which required them
again to judge screenshots of phish and legitimate messages (i.e. purely step
3 from the first session). We used the SosciSurvey online platform. The study
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was pre-tested and the feedback from the pre-test addressed and refinements
effected. The changes were mainly related to the content of the messages par-
ticipants were asked to judge. We decided to go for a quiz-like evaluation, with
security being the participant’s primary task. The alternative would have been a
study design in which the participant’s primary task is related to a cover story.
This would theoretically not prime them to expect and detect phish messages.
We had a number of reasons for choosing the former design. While one could
argue that the second option would have more external validity, it would have
been hard to maintain the deception in a lab study. As soon as participants
watched the video they would have known what the study was about. We could
have attempted a field study i.e. getting people to watch the video then sending
phishing alike messages at some unpredictable time in the future and measure
how many click on links or open an attachment. It is challenging to measure the
participant’s ability to identify phish at a distance though. If they do not click,
the message might not have been delivered, or they might not click because they
do not have an account with the “source”. When they click, it might be because
they know of the study setting and want to know what happens if they click.
We would not be able to determine whether they actually inspected the URL or
not, which is what the video trains them to do correctly. In particular, in a field
study, we cannot control whether some receive the email on a smartphone with a
more challenging setting than on a laptop. Thus, there are many uncontrollable
factors that could confound the findings.
Therefore, we decided to go for a study design in which security is partici-
pants’ primary task. Note that improved awareness is only the first step towards
taking action. In other words, if a user is not able to detect a phish when the
primary task is security, it is unlikely that he/she will detect the phish when
security is a secondary task. Thus, it is worth using a study design in which se-
curity is participants’ primary task. In essence, this gives us an upper boundary
for video effectiveness: the best we can hope to achieve.
3.2 Material
Messages were designed in such a way that a judgement could only be made
based on the actual URL. We had to acknowledge that participants could con-
sider a message as phish because they did not know the sender or did not have an
account with the web service provider. Therefore, we asked participants to imag-
ine the following scenario. They were Max Mu¨ller, who has an account with all
web services used in the study, and who has a colleague named Jonas Schmidt.
Furthermore, they were told that it was important for them to decide whether
a message was legitimate or not because the fraudulent messages would harm
them and ignored genuine messages could lead to negative consequences (we
wanted to avoid their simply classifying all messages as phishes, just to be safe).
This scenario was displayed when screenshots of messages had to be judged.
We used 16 messages in each task (pre, post, retention). All messages con-
tained plausible content. They were displayed during the evaluation in a ran-
domized order. Some more information about the messages:
5
Table 1. Overview of presented phishing messages (SB=Status Bar; TT=Tooltip)
Web address Type Inst. Sender of message
https://162.179.34.56/login TT 1+2 Service (DHL)
https://www.secure-documents-online.com/... SB 1+2 Person (Colleague)
https://control-center.1uncl1.de/... TT 1+3 Service (1 und 1)
https://www.volksbanknig.de/... TT 1+3 Service (Volksbank)
https://www.google.com.best-photos.com/... SB 1+2 Service (Google)
https://www.zehrukol.com/ebay.com/... TT 1+2 Person (Colleague)
https://www.bahncard.bahm.de/... SB 1+3 Service (DB)
https://www.cognstar.de/... SB 1+3 Service (Congstar)
– One half contained suspicious links, the other half legitimate links.6
– We derived messages from messages received from web services and private
contacts. Messages from web service providers were in the original design
with original text (only the URL was replaced for the “phishing” messages).
– For all screenshots, the mouse was positioned so that the actual URL was
displayed, depending on the software in place either in the tooltip (with Out-
look) or in the status bar (with Thunderbird or a web browser). The usage of
both types was equally distributed both for phishing messages as well as for
legitimate messages. It was technically not possible to only show the URL
when participants actually position the mouse on the link on SoSciSurvey.
– We designed phishing messages where instruction-1 was enough to judge
as well as those where instruction-2 or instruction-3 was needed (see
Table 1)
3.3 Recruiting and Ethics
An attempt was made to recruit participants from a wide range of ages. Recruit-
ment also took place via online platforms, social networks, flyers and personal
invitations. Participants were not compensated for participating but we encour-
aged participation by telling them they learn how to avoid falling victim.
The requirements for research involving the human being, defined by the
ethics committee of our university7, were satisfied. This includes the fact that
all data was collected independently of the identity of the participants. The email
addresses they provided to permit us to contact them for the retention study
were stored in a different database in a different order (as compared to their
answers in the two sessions). The entries from the first session were linked to the
one from the retention by asking participants to provide a random looking but
well-defined code — well defined because they were told how to generate it based
of names and birthdays from particular relatives. Furthermore, no third party
6 Due to the fact that we used a quiz-like evaluation, we could present half-half al-
though, in a realistic setting, half of people’s messages would not usually be phish.
7 https://www.intern.tu-darmstadt.de/gremien/ethikkommisson/zustndigkeit/
zustndigkeit.en.jsp
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(besides SosciSurvey) has a copy of the data and no third party was involved in
the evaluation of the data.
4 Evaluation – Results
There are two groups of people in our sample: Those participating only in the
first session (89: 39F/50M x¯=36.1 years) and those who participated in both
sessions (22: 12F/10M x¯=38.09 years). There were no statistically significant
differences between the groups; neither for age nor for gender. The distribution
of the degree of education is as follows: from the 89 participants in the first session
50 have a university or university of applied science degree and 21 have an A-level
qualification. The corresponding numbers for those 22 who participated in both
sessions are: ten and five respectively. For the descriptive statistic see Table 2.
Table 2. Overview of detection rates in % and their standard deviation (SD) for all
participants (all), those participating only in session 1 (G1) and those participating in
both sessions (G2)
Pre Post Retention
Phish G1 65.5 (SD 28.6) 83.8 (SD 20.5)
Phish G2 42.6 (SD 29.3) 86.9 (SD 18.3) 81.3 (SD 16.3)
Phish all 59.8 (SD 30.3) 84.55 (SD 20.0) 81.3 (SD 16.3)
Legitimate G1 75.8 (SD 21.2) 87.7 (SD 17.3)
Legitimate G2 75.0 (SD 21.1) 88.1 (SD 17.9) 83.0 (SD 20.3)
Legitimate all 75.6 (SD 21.1) 87.8 (SD 17.3) 83.0 (SD 20.3)
The performance change in detecting phishing and legitimate messages was
measured in terms of correctly detected phish and legitimate messages. The dif-
ference in performance before and after watching the video H1 was analysed
using a Repeated Measures ANOVA for both groups separately: (1) those par-
ticipating only in session one and (2) those participating in both sessions. Fur-
thermore we analysed the retention performance changes H2 using the Repeated
Measures ANOVA considering only the answers from those participating in both
sessions. The Mauchly Test indicates that there is a violation of Sphericity and
therefore a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was needed for the comparison of pre-
and post-performance. There was no violation of Sphericity to compare pre- and
retention-performance.
4.1 Phishing Detection
Pre-Post for All Participants: We first report the Repeated Measures
ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser correction for violated sphericity for the de-
tection of phishing messages by all participants: The within-subject factor in
time (pre and post performance) is significant with p < .001 and a η2=.526, i.e.
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the performance in detecting phishing messages changes significantly. In combi-
nation with the descriptive data (see Table 2), detection of phishing messages
increases significantly after watching the video. Thus, H1 can be accepted.
Participants during Retention: A Repeated Measures ANOVA for fraud-
ulent detection reveals a significant effect for the time (pre-, post- and retention-
performance) with p < .001 and a η2=.636. A post-hoc test with Bonferroni cor-
rection shows that there is a significant difference between pre- and post- with
p < .001 and there is a significant difference for pre- and retention-performance
with p < .001. Thus, H1 and H2 can be accepted for the group of participants
taking part in both sessions.
4.2 Identifying Legitimate Messages
Pre-Post for All Participants: We first report the Repeated Measures
ANOVA for identification rates. The within-subjects factor in time (pre- and
post-performance) is significant with p < .001 and a η2=.219, i.e. the perfor-
mance in detecting legitimate messages changes significantly. In combination
with the descriptive data (see Table 2), the identification of legitimate messages
improves significantly after watching the video. Thus, H1 can be accepted.
Participants during Retention: A Repeated Measures ANOVA reveals
a significant effect for the time (pre-, post- and retention-performance) with
p = .019 and a η2=.173. A post-hoc test with Bonferroni correction shows that
there is a significant difference between pre- and post-performance with p < .001.
Thus, H1 can be accepted.
4.3 Individual Messages
We also looked at the individual messages and their performance in order to
improve the video. The corresponding mean values are depicted in Tables 3 and
4 respectively (note the number for pre and post are for all 89 participants).
Table 3. Detection rate, in %, for individual phishing URLs
Web address Pre Post Ret.
162.179.34.56/login 55.1 93.3 81.8
control-center.1uncl1.de/... 63.6 93.3 90.9
www.google.com.best-photos.com/... 55.1 84.3 81.8
www.zehrukol.com/ebay.com/... 65.2 73.0 54.5
www.secure-documents-online.com/... 47.2 68.5 77.3
www.bahncard.bahm.de/... 66.3 91.0 90.9
www.cognstar.de/... 53.9 80.9 86.4
www.volksbanknig.de/... 73.0 92.1 86.4
Two particular phishing messages stand out where participants performed more
poorly, as compared to the other phishing messages:
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– Message using the legitimate URL (...docs.google.com/...) as HTML link in
the text but “https://www.secure-documents-online.com” as the actual
URL in the status bar. The message was identified correctly by 68.5% (lowest
result) of participants after watching the video and 77.3% (second lowest
result) in the retention session.
– Message using the actual URL “https://www.zehrukol.com/ebay.com/
software?id=12123213124” in the text and in the tooltip: 73.0% (second
lowest result) identified this message correctly after watching the video and
54.5% (lowest result) during the retention session.
Table 4. Detection rate in % for individual legitimate URLs
Web address Pre Post Ret.
marketresearch.apple.com/... 61.8 84.3 81.8
photos.google.com/... 82.0 88.8 95.5
our university (anonymised) 94.4 97.8 100.0
www.dropbox.com/... 80.9 88.8 81.8
www.gutefrage.net/... 83.1 97.8 81.8
buchung.lufthansa.com/... 88.8 86.5 77.3
www.vodafone.de/... 51.7 71.9 59.1
accout.wire.com/... 62.5 86.5 86.4
Two legitimate messages stand out (the first one was particularly troublesome):
– “https://www.vodafone.de/(...)”: 71.9% identified this correctly in the
first session, with only 59.1% during the second session.
– “https://buchung.lufthansa.com/servlet/cc?soDBYCTTDV
YTEz0.26wa7uDU.261f7uuF.3df4D.2e.26EaEXEPNRTOOL_LINKEhttp:DVMD.
..”: The identification rate after watching the video was 86.5% with 77.3%
correct identification during session 2.
4.4 Open Feedback
Positive comments mentioned the simplicity of the video, the clarity of the con-
tent and the general comprehensibility. In particular, they liked the fact that the
video was not overloaded with information. Regarding the overall design, partic-
ipants liked the idea of using this type of animated video for general knowledge
transfer. Feedback for improving the video was: ‘More examples of the different
phishing tricks’ and ‘Summary at the end of the video’.
5 Discussion
The five-minute video significantly improved phish and legitimate message de-
tection. In other words, after watching the video, participants were able to detect
phishing URLs without becoming overly cautious.
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The retention part of our study is of special interest since in real life people do
not receive phishing messages on a daily basis due to improvements in technical
measures that filter out these messages. It is unlikely that people will use their
newly-acquired knowledge very often, so they are likely to forget instructions
and hints from the video. Our participants improved significantly in terms of
detecting phishing messages, whereas detection rates for legitimate messages
stabilised. We suggest possible explanations for this observation:
– “www.vodafone.de/(...)”: The mean detection rate, after watching the
video, was 71.9% with 59.1% at retention. The message contained a tele-
phone number and, instead of starting with ‘Dear Martin ...’, it started with
‘Dear +1 121 34329’8. A paragraph in the email stated that Vodafone would
always address their customers by their name. The issue, in this case, is that
Vodafone does send emails to the phone number if the customer has not
provided their name. We acknowledge that we did not spot this problem
ourselves during the video refinement.
– “https://buchung.lufthansa.com/s(...)/cc?soDBYCT(...)”: The mean
detection rate, after watching the video, was 86.5% with 77.3% at reten-
tion. The problem here might be the length of the URL. The path contains
HTTP twice, includes a number of dots and the term ‘redirect’. This prob-
ably elicited suspicion. Again, the email was not altered from the original
sent out by the company, besides changing the name of the customer.
The two phishing messages that evaded detection to the greatest extent were
related to hints provided in instruction-2. In the first case, participants did
not detect the mismatch between the HTML-text-based URL displayed in the
message and the actual destination URL displayed in the status bar. In the
second case, participants are likely to have considered the path to be relevant in
making their judgement. An improved video will have to explain these cases more
clearly. The video did a great job with respect to instruction-3. While these
cases always performed worst in previous evaluations, they performed better
after the video.
Most of the feedback regarding improving the video was related to extending
it. This is interesting because we tried to keep it as short as possible while
retaining efficacy. Two aspects might be worth considering in terms of improving
the video: (1) make the fact that only the URL matters even more salient. (2)
provide a summary at the end of the video to consolidate and reinforce concepts.
Note that, unlike studies reported by [29], we did not observe any age differ-
ences. This might be because security was their primary task. However, if the
study had been carried out in the wild, our findings might well have coincided
with those reported by [29].
Finally, it was interesting to observe that those participants who had many
issues with detecting phishing messages in the pre-quiz were most likely to partic-
ipate in the retention study. One possible explanation is that they really enjoyed
8 The number we used in the message was randomly chosen, but realistic.
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the video and were thankful for their improved awareness. One additional in-
terpretation is that the video, in particular, addressed those who had very little
pre-existing awareness of phishing.
5.1 Limitations
Almost half of the original 89 participants gave us their email addresses to con-
tact them for the retention study. Half of these responded to our retention study
request. We ended up with a sample of only 22 participants to participate in the
retention session. This means that we cannot realistically generalise the results to
the whole population. The participant sample, as a whole, is not representative,
as most of our participants had an A-level certificate or university degree. Fur-
thermore, due to the fact that we told participants, during recruiting, that they
would learn how to protect themselves against online fraud if they took part, we
probably attracted participants who were already interested in this topic. Thus,
as future work, we should run the study with a different demographic.
Furthermore, participant performance should definitely be considered a “best-
case” scenario, because security was their primary task. Their actual detection
rates are likely to be poorer in the real world. However, an increased awareness
of phishing detection is a necessary first step to resilience. Before watching the
video, people were not able to detect phishes despite it being their primary task.
This is why awareness programs are important.
We used the same messages in all sessions. It may be argued that one expla-
nation for post-video improvement was that they already knew what to look for.
This might be a valid observation, but the chances seem small because legitimate
message detection rates actually decreased. Furthermore, it is unlikely that after
eight weeks they would still remember all the messages they had seen before,
including the correct judgement. It is also worth mentioning that participants
were not given feedback about which messages they had judged correctly, and
which not.
Due to technical limitations of SosciSurvey, participants did not need to hover
over the link deliberately in order to display the actual destination URL. It was
automatically provided on the screenshot. It could be argued that we don’t know
whether people would hover over links because our study did not require this
essential first step. On the other hand, being aware of the need to hover must
be helpful.
5.2 Video Improvements
Based on the results, we identified a number of issues with the video, which
we addressed in order to maximize performance. The new video lasts only 5:09
minutes and spends more time on examples. Previously, the who-areas were high-
lighted in green and only sub-domains highlighted in red. Now this highlighting
is extended to the path. Moreover, the video now explicitly tells people when
a URL is a phishing URL. We now conclude the video with a summary of the
lessons learned, including tips and hints.
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6 Related Work
A number of user studies were conducted to gain insights into the mental models
of message recipients, or to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-phishing measures.
For example, a game-based anti-phishing educational approach in was used by
[30], [2, 4, 13, 14, 16, 32, 34–36, 42, 44]. The effectiveness of some of these games
has been evaluated in user studies [4, 14, 16, 30, 32, 34, 35, 44] with [16] and [32]
comparing the effectiveness of a game-based approach with text-based awareness.
Of these, only the proposal in [32] is further evaluated in a retention study
a week later [25]. Usually the participants in user studies are adults, but some
researchers have started studying phishing education for children [27].
Another approach to anti-phishing education, utilises the so-called teachable
moments: participants were sent a simulated phishing email with a suspicious-
looking link. If they clicked on it, they were directed to a landing page containing
phishing-related information. Such an approach, in particular, has been used
by Caputo et al. [8]. The authors also conducted a retention study of anti-
phishing training in a corporate setting after a period of 90 days. The results
of the study, however, did not indicate any significant improvement. A similar
approach has been used in further research [19,23,24], both of which conducted
retention studies after one week, that did show significant improvements in terms
of reducing participants’ susceptibility to phishing emails. A further study [22]
built upon the evaluation in [23, 24] and tested the participants’ retention via
multiple simulated phishing emails sent over the course of 28 days, with the
results showing no significant loss of retention by the end of study. A similar
approach but with spear phishing messages was studied in [9, 38]. The study
in [10] further evaluated the effectiveness of an anti-phishing training based on
three simulated phishing trials over a two month period, showing significant
improvements even after the end of the study.
Other anti-phishing educational approaches include training materials, edu-
cational videos and e-learning modules. As such, a study in [45] evaluated an
anti-phishing training coupled with motivational videos. Participants in the con-
trol group watched cooking videos instead. The study found that the training
increased participants’ ability to detect phishing emails, but also increased the
rate of false positives. The authors did not test the retention effect of the train-
ing. A study reported by [31] compared the performance of several anti-phishing
educational approaches, including the game-based approach from [32], training
materials from [24] and popular anti-phishing materials found on the web. All
of these approaches significantly improved participant ability to detect phishing
links. Retention was not tested. An anti-phishing e-learning module was devel-
oped by [21] but was only evaluated with a small sample of participants, and
retention was also not tested.
7 Conclusion
Modern technology allows confidence tricksters to target a large number of peo-
ple using phishing messages, at minimal cost. It is still desirable for people to
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know how to detect these messages as technology is far away from detecting
100%. In this paper we report on the development of a video to raise phishing
awareness without deterring confirmation of the legitimacy of genuine messages.
We used our knowledge and experience from past research to develop a short yet
effective phish-awareness video. Our main aim was to cover the most relevant
content in a short video to address the companies’ needs to raise awareness,
but not necessarily to have the luxury of spending between 20 and 45 minutes
to do so. The video was evaluated by 89 participants. Furthermore, a retention
study, in which 22 of these 89 participants took part, was conducted after eight
weeks. The results of the study show that the ability of the participants to dis-
tinguish between phishing and legitimate links increased significantly directly
after watching the video and that, even after eight weeks, the participants were
significantly better at detecting phishing links than before watching the video.
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